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Portugal
THE STATE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY




On 25 April 2017, Portugal celebrated 43 
years of democracy and the 41st anniversary 
of the Constitution (1976). Still, even though 
the regime’s democratic consistency has 
evolved over the last decades, by 2012 Portu-
gal had one of the highest public debts in the 
European Union (EU) and struggled to com-
-
tugal was able to meet the EU Stability and 
Notwithstanding that Portugal, as other 
states, escaped severe forms of populism, 
there is an undeniable disenchantment with 
representative democracy as a form of legit-
imatization of power.1  Liberal democracies 
are struggling with the political apathy of the 
electorate, which is visible in the high rates 
of abstention in electoral acts.
Subsequent to the presentation of the current 
constitutional and economic framework, we 
address some of the most relevant constitu-
tional developments of 2017, such as the mu-
nicipal elections, the economic sustainabili-
ty of the traditional press and mass media in 
political parties, the failings of civil protec-
and October, intelligence services’ access to 
metadata, and relevant labour law changes. 
1 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Populismos e a (in)completude democrática’ (Observador 2017) < http://
observador.pt/opiniao/populismos-e-a-incompletude-democratica/ > accessed February 2018.
2 Marina Costa Lobo, António Costa Pinto and Pedro C. Magalhães, ‘Portuguese Democratisation 40 
Years on: Its Meaning and Enduring Legacies’ (2016) 21 SESP 163, 175.
3 Catarina Santos Botelho, Os direitos sociais em tempos de crise (Almedina 2015) 435. 
II. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ON 
THE RISE OR DECLINE?
-
cades of the right-wing authoritarian dicta-
torship of Salazar and Marcello Caetano, a 
bloodless military coup marked the begin-
ning of the Portuguese revolutionary transi-
tion towards democracy. Empirical studies 
-
ments” on the matters of health, education, 
housing and standards of living in the last 
decades.2  Yet, because GDP growth was 
around zero from 2000 to 2008 and then neg-
ative in 2012 and 2013, Portugal struggled to 
Portugal’s three-year EUR 78-billion inter-
national bailout consisted in a Memorandum 
of Understanding agreed to between the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank 
(known as “Troika”). The agreement with 
Troika was signed by both Government par-
ties (centre-right and conservatives) and the 
socialist opposition (centre-left). Between 
2011 and 2014, Portuguese legislators ad-
hered to a very strict austerity programme, 
which predictably led to unpopular public 
policies and stressed Portugal’s social fabric.3 
After the Troika’s intervention and the cen-
tre-right Government’s (2011-15) action, 
from 11.2% in 2010 to 4.4% in 2015 (3.2% 
* I am grateful to Ana Teresa Ribeiro (Universidade Católica Portuguesa), Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro (Portu-
guese Constitutional Court) and Nuno Garoupa (Texas A&M) for the helpful suggestions. The usual disclaim-
ers apply. 
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excluding one-off operations, which do not 
In 2016, with a socialist minority government 
(with parliamentary support of the other left-
and was able to meet the EU Stability and 
4 
Although Portugal has moved away from the 
prospect of a second bailout on the grounds 
of a stronger economy and lower unemploy-
national debt interest rates, the continuous 
cut in public investment and the absence 
of structural reforms still worry several ex-
perts. For the upcoming years, several chal-
lenges arise such as growth potential, which 
remains low (1.5% of GDP according to 
Fitch), public debt decrease sustainability in 
terms of GDP ratio and the risk of bailouts to 
the banking system, all of which may affect 
economic growth. 
-
ic crisis, which clearly impacted the balance 
of power amongst the mainstream parties 
(centre-left, centre-right and conservatives), 
populist movements
Portuguese societal and political arena. The 
crisis had negative effects on the econom-
ic sustainability of the traditional press and 
mass media in general. This situation can 
jeopardise both pluralism of opinion and 
information quality. An eventual absence of 
stable and independent mass media might 
have pernicious effects on liberal democracy 
pillars.
Empirical studies demonstrate that we must 
be wary of quickly concluding that such 
crises and scarcity are the only variables 
responsible for the decline in institutional 
trust. There are some indicators that the per-
4 Decision of the Council of the European Union 2017/1225, of June 2017 < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uris-
erv:OJ.L_.2017.174.01.0019.01.ENG > accessed February 2018.
5 Mariano Torcal, ‘The Decline of Political Trust in Spain and Portugal: Economic Performance or Political Responsiveness?’ (2014) 58 ABS 1542, 1561.
6 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘O voto é um direito ou um dever?’ (Observador 2017), < http://observador.pt/opiniao/o-voto-e-um-direito-ou-um-dever/ > 
accessed February 2018.
7 https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/247/40 Aina Gallego, Unequal Political Participation Worldwide (CUP 2014), João Cancela and Benny Geys, 
‘Explaining voter turnout: A meta-analysis of national and subnational elections’ (2016) 42 ES, 264.
8 Gianluca Passarelli, ‘The government in two semi-presidential systems: France and Portugal in a comparative perspective’ (2010) 8 FP 40, and O. Amorim 
Neto and Marina Costa Lobo, ‘Portugal’s semi-presidentialism (re)considered: An assessment of the President’s role in the policy process, 1976-2006’, in 
Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics (2012) 49. 
-
nant factor.5
From a global perspective, the available in-
Portuguese justice system. As several other 
to the complexity of law procedures and the 
consequent high congestion rate. Nonethe-
less, the Portuguese Public Prosecution Ser-
vice has allowed corruption scandals involv-
ing high-level politicians and business elites 
abusing public funds to be fully investigated, 
even though many are still pending. 
Disenchantment with politics is a reality of 
today’s liberal democracies.6  In this sense, 
many citizens feel alienated from the politi-
cal sphere and do not believe that traditional 
partisan structures are the answer to exer-
cise their voting rights. As far as Portugal is 
concerned, the country’s turnout metrics are 
quite disturbing: 2014 EU Parliament elec-
tions, 33.67%; 2015 parliamentary elections, 
55.84%; 2016 presidential elections, 48.70%; 
and 2017 local elections, 55%.7  There is a 
controversy over these numbers since it is 
estimated that about 1 million people are not 
residents in the electoral districts. If so, we 
should add about 15% to these percentages 
to get the actual turnout, and thus they are 
more aligned with European standards.
In sum, the lack of participation in day-to-
day deliberations raises scepticism towards 
a representative democracy that does not in-
corporate strong participatory and delibera-
tive mechanisms. 
On 1 October 2017, Portugal held local elec-
-
tion of the political arena. The downfall of 
the former right-wing Government was in-
terpreted by some supporters as a breach in 
the constitutional praxis of the last decades. 
Portugal has a semi-presidential government 
system in which a directly elected President 
exists alongside a Government, the latter be-
ing politically responsible vis-à-vis the Pres-
ident and the Parliament.8  
Article 187/1 of the Constitution states that 
the President appoints the Prime Minister 
“in the light of the electoral results”. In the 
2015 legislative elections, the colligation 
PàF (Portugal à Frente), which gathered the 
centre-right party PSD (Social Democratic 
Party) and the conservative CDS-PP (Popu-
lar Party), won by 39%. 
However, after being nominated by Presi-
dent Cavaco Silva as Government, the col-
ligation PàF was not able to pass its pro-
gramme within the Parliament. A motion of 
rejection of the Government’s programme 
was approved by 123 votes, determining its 
fall (articles 194/4 and 195/1/d) of the Con-
stitution). For that reason, this Government 
was the shortest one in the history of the Por-
tuguese constitutional democracy, governing 
only for 28 days. 
According to the Constitution, the President 
was doubly limited. In fact, due to him being 
since its election (article 172/1), he was not 
able to dissolve the Parliament and call an 
early general election.
This constitutional impasse led to a political 
crisis and the President only had three viable 
options: (a) maintain a caretaker Govern-
ment, which was not the best solution, since 
the Government would have to “limit itself 
to undertaking the acts that are strictly nec-
essary in order to ensure the management 
of public affairs” (article 185/6 of the Con-
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stitution) and therefore, with a low political 
legitimacy, could not underplay innovative 
legislative acts; (b) nominate a government 
of presidential initiative, in a broader-based 
parties that had signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding with Troika. Nevertheless, 
due to the distressing political crisis, such 
composition would almost certainly fail 
again when submitting its programme to the 
Parliament; and (c) nominate a Government 
of the Socialist Party (which was the second 
most voted party), after two other left-wing 
parties – the Communists (PCP) and the Left 
their parliamentary support. The President 
opted for this last alternative, believing it 
since the establishment of democracy, PCP 
and BE supported the party in government. 
Even if the nomination of the current Gov-
ernment was consistent with the Portuguese 
Constitution, it generated some criticism 
amongst the PSD and CDS-PP, the elections’ 
winning parties.9  In my opinion, behind this 
political distress was the fact that there was a 
kind of “gentlemen’s agreement” according 
to which the political alliances in the Parlia-
ment would be made known to the elector-
ate a priori and not a posteriori. However, 
while the assertion that the party/colligation 
with the highest percentage of votes wins the 
elections is correct, it does not mean that it is 
entitled to form a government. It is one thing 
to win the legislative elections, another to 
form a government.
As one could easily wonder, these uncom-
fortable political tensions raised a lot of ex-
pectation as to the results of the municipal 
elections. The Socialist Party (PS) raised its 
9 See Francisca Almeida, ‘Da (in)admissibilidade constitucional de um Governo de esquerda’ (Expresso 2015) < http://expresso.sapo.pt/blogues/blogue_o_
lado_a_do_lado_b/2015-10-18-Da--in-admissibilidade-constitucional-de-um-Governo-de-esquerda> accessed February 2018.
10 Law no. 19/2003, 20 June 2003. 
11 More broadly and concerning the competences of the PCC, see Maria Lúcia Amaral and Ravi Afonso Pereira, ‘Um tribunal como os outros. Justiça con-
stitucional e interpretação da constituição’ in Estudos em Homenagem ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura Ramos (Almedina 2016) 435.
12 Nuno Garoupa, ‘Da forma à substância na lei dos partidos’ (Diário de Notícias 2018) < https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/opiniao-dn/nuno-garoupa/interior/da-
forma-a-substancia-da-lei-dos-partidos-9050460.html > accessed February 2018.
13 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity and judicial activism: trilogy or trinity?’ (2017) 3 (4) CALQ 62, Michel Rosen-
feld, ‘Constitutional adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and contrasts’ in European and US Constitutionalism (CUP 2005) 197, 205 and 
Rupert Scholz, ‘Konstitutionalisierte Politik oder politisierte Konstitution?’ in Realitätsprägung durch Verfassungsrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2008) 9, 12.
14 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘O lugar do Tribunal Constitucional no século XXI: os limites funcionais da justiça constitucional na relação com os demais tribu-
nais e com o legislador’ (2018) 34 Julgar.
number of mayors from 149 to 159, whereas 
the PSD obtained its worst result ever at lo-
cal elections. In Lisbon, the Portuguese cap-
ital, the PSD candidate only earned 11.2% 
of the votes. CDS-PP had a positive result 
in Lisbon, but was defeated in the rest of the 
country with about 3% of the national vote. 
As for BE, the result was positive. On the 
contrary, the Communist Party vote share di-
minished from 11.1% to 9.5%.
 
On 21 December 2017, the Parliament ap-
proved, by a large majority, changes to the 
-
ical parties.10  Only CDS-PP and PAN (Peo-
ple-Animals-Nature Party) voted against it. 
In the previous year, Justice Manuel Costa 
Andrade, President of the Portuguese Con-
stitutional Court (PCC), had requested the 
Parliament to alter the oversight model for 
of an independent entity to control political 
-
parties already received criticism amongst 
constitutionalists.11  
Some argued that the President of the PCC 
should not make legislative suggestions, 
since constitutional courts are not policy-
makers.12  In my point of view, though, the 
separation of powers does not mean total 
imperviousness, especially when consider-
ing the Constitution. Additionally, and more 
importantly, these recommendations were 
given in a non-binding, informal and coop-
erative way.
If it is true that the reign of politics should 
not dethrone the reign of law, it is also true 
that, as the fundamental law of a political 
community, the Constitution is a political 
norm: a norm about the production of other 
norms. Since the post-War period, constitu-
tional texts have become more politicised, 
breeding “constitutional expectations” that 
might breach constitutional constancy.13  Al-
courts are not co-legislators, we also read 
elsewhere that “nothing positive comes from 
exorcising the Constitution and constitution-
alism itself from politics, as if both were im-
penetrable domains. There is no Constitution 
without politics. And maybe that assertion 
14 
However, the extent of the changes to the 
law in question went far beyond the PCC 
recommendations. The breach of the tradi-
tion of public funding and the opening of the 
door to private donations prompted an out-
cry in Portuguese social media.
The main alterations are the following: a) 
creation of an Entity for Political Accounts 
and Financing (ECFP), which would inves-
tigate irregularities and illegalities of pol-
iticians and electoral campaigns’ accounts 
decisions could be appealed to the Portu-
guese Constitutional Court; b) abolition of 
the fund-raising ceiling; c) extension of VAT 
exemption to political parties (it previously 
encompassed goods and services obtained 
to spread the political message or their own 
identities, and would now be also applied to 
all purchases of goods and services respect-
ing parties’ activities); and d) a transitory 
norm casts doubts on whether these chang-
es would be applicable retroactively. In that 
scenario, this law could be applicable to 
pending cases, allowing political parties to 
recover VAT from previous years.
Given the political relevance of organic laws, 
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Members of the Assembly of the Republic 
could ask the Constitutional Court to under-
take the prior consideration of constitution-
ality on these diplomas (article 278/4 of the 
Constitution), but they decided not to. On 3 
January 2018, President Marcelo Rebelo de 
Sousa, vetoed this law given “the absence of 
grounds concerning the changes in the way 
-
dergo public scrutiny”. The bill was returned 
to the Parliament, which could “validate it 
by a majority that is at least equal to two-
thirds of all Members present and is greater 
than an absolute majority of all the Members 
of the Constitution). However, most parties 
acknowledged that the law might need fur-
III. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
2017 was a tragic year due to the lethal na-
-
tober. Around 100 people died and over 
500,000 hectares of forests were burned in 
what was considered Portugal’s deadliest 
year on record for wildfires. The Portuguese 
Government was heavily criticised for the 
failings of the civil protection services and 
policies. CDS-PP put to the vote a motion 
which was rejected (by 122 to 105) thanks to 
the parliamentary support given by the left-
wing parties. 
 
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, in a speech ad-
dressing this situation, hinted he could use 
his presidential powers to dissolve the Gov-
ernment or even the Parliament unless “for-
top priorities”. The assertiveness of the Pres-
ident and the social turmoil that followed 
such tragedies had several consequences: 
(a) the Portuguese Internal Affairs Minister 
15 Opinion 51/2015 < https://www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/Par/40_51_2015.pdf > accessed February 2018.
16 Ruling no. 403/15, 27th of December, 2015 < http://w3b.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/acordaos/20150403s.html > accessed February 2018.
17 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Novo ou velho direito? – O direito ao esquecimento e o princípio da proporcionalidade no constitucionalismo global’(2018) 7 
AB INSTANTIA 49.
18 Opinion no. 38/2017, 30th of May, 2017 < https://www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/Par/40_38_2017.pdf > accessed February 2018.
Constança Urbano de Sousa resigned; (b) 
commission of independent technical ex-
perts was nominated and its report point-
monitoring, civil protection response and 
emergency communications. This commis-
sion was given the task of analysing the sec-
-
eral policy measures were announced by the 
Government in order to maintain forests and 
State’s responsibility was at stake for fail-
ing to protect its citizens, the Government 
agreed to an extrajudicial agreement, medi-
ated by the Ombudsman, stipulating mone-
tary compensation to the families and heirs 
seriously injured therein.
It is relevant to mention that, on 20 October 
2017, Maria Lúcia Amaral, former Justice 
(2007-2016) and Vice-President of the Con-
stitutional Court was elected by the Parlia-
November of that same year. Since 1999, the 
Portuguese Ombudsman has been credited 
an “A” status by the United Nations, in full 
compliance with the Paris Principles.  
The Portuguese Data Protection Author-
ity (CNPD), presided since 2012 by Filipa 
Calvão, is an independent body which su-
pervises and monitors compliance with the 
laws and regulations in the area of personal 
data protection. Its previous consultation on 
legal provisions relating to the processing 
of personal data is mandatory. In October 
2015, the CNPD pronounced itself against 
parliamentary legislation (Decree no. 426/
the Security Information Service (SIS) and 
the Strategic and Defence Information Ser-
and other electronic communications-related 
data for purposes of prevention of phenom-
ena such as terrorism, espionage, sabotage 
and highly organised crime as long as certain 
conditions (necessity, appropriateness and 
proportionality) were respected.15  
The legislative goal was not to access con-
tent of communications (written or voice) 
but to obtain authorisation to demand the 
metadata (data about data) from the entities 
that treat data, concurring the conditions un-
der which communications took place (loca-
Two months later, and following the request 
of prior control from the President of the Re-
public Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court (PCC) took the view 
that the legislation was in breach of article 
34/4 of the Portuguese Constitution, which 
prohibits public authorities from engaging in 
any form of intrusion into communications 
other than in the cases provided for in crim-
inal procedural law.16  The intent of this pro-
vision is to protect the privacy of individuals 
and the right to communicational self-deter-
mination.17 
In August 2017, Organic Law 4/2017 was 
published, regulating the access of SIS and 
SIED to telecommunications and Internet 
data outside criminal proceedings. The nov-
elty in this legislative reformulation is judi-
cial supervision and prior authorisation for 
the access to telecommunication and Internet 
data, carried out by a group of judges from 
the Supreme Court of Justice.
The CNPD, which had already decided 
against the previous legislation proposal, 
carried out within the scope of criminal pre-
vention, and therefore outside the constitu-
tional scope of criminal proceedings by the 
SIS and SIED, both non-criminal investi-
gation bodies, this act is still in violation of 
the aforementioned constitutional rules and 
principles.18  Even acknowledging that it is 
a “high-level judicial control”, the CNPD 
problematises its operability because the ab-
sence of “a clear and standardised procedure 
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(...) constitutes a very considerable obstacle 
to the legality and constitutionality of the 
“infringes the prohibition of intrusion in the 
electronic communications provided for in 
the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 
as well as the rules of the Constitution, the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union and the European Convention 
on Human Rights”.  
On 14 August, the President of the Repub-
lic Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa promulgated 
the diploma, invoking the “broad consen-
sus [was] reached in order to overcome the 
doubts that had given rise to the previous 
request for preventive constitutional review” 
as well as “the relevance of the regime in 
question for the defence of the Democratic 
Rule of Law, in particular for the protection 
of fundamental rights”. PCP and BE request-
ed successive control of constitutionality to 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court (articles 
281 and 282). 
In Portuguese Labour Law, a collective 
agreement is not immediately binding to all 
employees in an undertaking, since it only 
union that entered into it with their employ-
er (or the employers’ association the latter 
belongs to). However, this extension can 
be achieved through courts or the Govern-
-
sions have demanded the extension of salary 
clauses based on the constitutional principle 
equal payment for equal work (article 59/1/a) 
of the Constitution). The Government can 
also intervene by extending collective agree-
ments through administrative regulation.19 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2018
In 2018 the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
will most likely decide on recent legislation 
(or legislative projects) regarding the fol-
lowing issues: (a) legislation on medically 
assisted reproduction; (b) access to metadata 
by information services of the Portuguese 
Republic; (c) legalisation of euthanasia and 
19
Employment Relations and Transformations of the Enterprise in the Global Economy (G. Giappichelli Editore 2016) 247.
assisted suicide; (d) legalisation of cannabis; 
(e) legalisation of prostitution.  
On 4 October 2018, the Estoril Institute for 
-
tugal Talks with the theme “voter turnout”. 
Nuno Garoupa, who is joined by Marina 
Costa Lobo, Pedro Magalhães and Catarina 
Santos Botelho. A working group will be 
-
nal report with proposals aimed at reducing 
electoral abstention and improving the qual-
ity of democracy.
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